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INTRODUCTION
The area in the midstream of the Mailuu-Suu River is the most
landslide-prone and vulnerable of the entire Kyrgyzstan territory.
More than 200 landslide sources distinct by genesis, age and devel-
opment stages have been fixed at present in the outskirts of the
Mailuu-Suu town within an area of 80 km2 only.
The main reasons of mountain slopes instability in this area are
the geologic conditions and geodynamic peculiarities of the region.
Seismic, climatic and man-caused factors play a role of rather a trig-
ger mechanism for landslide initiation and development.
Among the general geologic factors that lead to the intensive
development of landslide processes in the area besides the Mailuu-
Suu valley specific topography and erosion processes are the follow-
ing:
- composition, characteristics and bedding conditions of rocks and
soils on the slopes, specifically the most active landslides are
developed in loess-like loamy soils of the Quaternary period (Q1
- Q3), as well as in slightly consolidated Mesozoic-Cenozoic sed-
iments, layered by strata of weakly stable fissured limestones and
sandstones alternating with interlayers of clays and siltstones;
- watering of soils and rocks which are components of unstable
slopes either by large quantity of atmospheric precipitation infil-
tration or by groundwater impact including the ones coming
along tectonic failures from the remote mountainous feeding
areas of the Boobash-Ata mountain range (Fergana ridge);
- structurally-tectonic and geodynamical features of the area,
namely tectonic dislocations and folds.
The studied region is characterized by high seismicity (M»7)
associated with modern geodynamic activity and continuous oro-
genic processes. Contemporary recent horizontal (up to 10 mm/year)
and vertical (up to 5 mm/year) earth crust movements are actively
developed here. Besides, the area of the development of numerous
and active landslides in the eastern mountain framing of Fergana val-
ley coincides spatially with the zone of the intensive compression
caused by the south-north pressure from the Pamirs side (WETZEL et
alii, 2000).
Along the Mailuu-Suu River valley edges and its main tributaries
40 landslides at a stage of the main movement or their preparatory
phase have been registered. The most hazardous from them with rela-
tion to landslide river blockage with possible catastrophic effects are
the large-sized Koi-Tash and Tectonic landslides located close by
(Figure 1). These landslides generation started in 1954 on the left
edge of the valley within the zone of the regional Central (Arslanbob)
fault and the Main anticline. The detailed description of these and
other landslides of considered area is presented in a series of papers
(c.f. TORGOEV et alii, 2001).
LANDSLIDE DAMS IN MAILUU-SUU
From the beginning of the current landslide activation period in
Mailuu-Suu in the late 80th and in the early 90th 7 episodes of partial and
complete river blockage triggered by landslides were fixed. Moreover,
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Figure 1 -Landslides and tailings in the Mailuu-Suu and areas of potential
river blockage
5 of them were observed at the large Tectonic landslide site. The mas-
ter data of landslide dams at this site are given in Table 1.
The most disastrous effects provoked river blockage in June 1992
when about 1.5×106 m3 of landslide masses caved into the valley.
The ground mass of the Northern tongue collapsed during 10-15 min-
utes with initial velocity approximately 5 m/s, after that the whole
mass displacement continued for another 30 minutes. River valley on
the blocked site has trapezoid profile with sufficiently wide bottom
(90 m), therefore dam height didn’t exceed 15 m and the river with
maximum water fillup overtopped the landslide dam at the right edge
of the valley gradually eroding the dam. However, regardless of that
and of the relatively low water discharge in the river Q ≅ 20-25 m3/s
(Qmax=108 m
3/s in 1969) the accumulated reservoir was about 6 m
deep and flooded area affected two-storeyed dwellings, industrial
buildings and constructions, transport and engineering services. Near
the Isolith factory Southern landslide tongue passed through the sad-
dle and reached valley bottom partially blocking the river. General
damage caused by the landslide and flooding amounted almost 40
mln. US dollars. In 1994 as a consequence of repeated movements of
the southern landslide tongue rather small tailing No 17 containing
about 7000 m3 of radioactive waste was carried away into the river
and again it blocked the river located nearby the factory.
RISK ASSESSMENTS IN CASE OF POSSIBLE RIVER
BLOCKAGE
It is worth noting that landslide potential on the Tectonic site has
not completely exhausted yet. Besides, in 1993-94 landslide process-
es activation started at the Koi-Tash site with total volume of mass
movement about 5×106 m3 and with possibility of the river blockage. 
In the head part of the Tectonic landslide, specifically on the
Southern anticline flank there is more than 0.5×106 m3 of soil and
large amount of limestone debris in an unstable state. In case of fur-
ther shearing at this part of the slope and simultaneous sliding of the
entire unstable mass there is a possibility of repeated river blockage
North of the Isolith factory. Besides, the most hazardous environ-
mental threat is related to the sliding of about 80 thousand m3 of
debris towards tailings No 3, 9 and 18.
The main hazard during landslide-caused destruction of unstable
tailing No 3 containing 120 thousand m3 of high-activity radioactive
waste is associated with its release into the river channel with subse-
quent radioactive contamination of flood-plain and river debris cone
on the territory of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
Thus, in case of possible landslide masses collapse onto the tail-
ings No 3 and 18 hazardous processes may develop in two following
ways:
“tails” gradually creeping into the river and their washout by river
water where river water-level will neither flash and nor exceed
the bounds of flooding zone as it was observed in April 1958 dur-
ing  tailing No 7 failure process; 
volley (instantaneous) tails outburst into the river with riverbed
blockage by tails and landslide masses triggering water accumu-
lation above the dam level (Figure 2) and inundation of the
Isolith factory territory. Unavoidable consequent dam breach will
affect valley downstream by flooding and respective radioactive
contamination.
The most substantial results of catastrophic phase modeling of
tailings No 3 and 18 collapse caused by landslide are the following:
in any variants of landslide collapse about 50% of high-activity tails
and landslide masses will fall into the river flood-plain. They will
form a dam 10-15 m high and 60 m wide (see figure 2). Maximum
speed of landslide mass movement may amount up to 36 m/s and the
catastrophic movement phase may last from 14 to 17 seconds. Total
volume of accumulated water will be 120000 m3 with river discharge
average rate about 50 m3/s during spring season. Dam will be over-
topped in 40 minutes; in the extreme case (100 m3/s discharge rate)
it will take 20 minutes. Thus, the territory with absolute marks below
986 m, left-bank highway and the Isolith factory area will be inun-
dated (ALESHIN et alii, 2002).
Recently high probability of landslide masses increase and river
blockage at the Koi-Tash site (see figure 1) was found. In such a case
it will be possible that hazardous flooding can affect not only tailings
No 5 and 7, but also outburst wave after dam breach with cause
severe destruction and radioactive contamination of the river down-
stream. Recent landslide formation on the ancient landslide slope at
Koi-Tash began in sixties. Shearing activation was fixed here in
1993-1994 when 22 dwellings lying on the landslide body have been
deformed and destroyed.
According to the preliminary estimates the total volume of the
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Landslide dams on the Tectonic landslide site
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Koi-Tash unstable part of the Koi-Tash slope is about 5×106 m3 with
average thickness of landslide body of 15 m and the landslide area of
330000 m2. Landslide body is composed of loess-like loamy soils
characterized by high porosity and low effective cohesion. The land-
slide is confined to the active central (Arslanbob) fracture zone
branching from structurally dominating Talas-Fergana regional tran-
sorogenic fault.
According to the geophysical data substantial watering of land-
slide body usually takes place in July at the expense of groundwater
coming along the central fault zone from the remote feeding terrain.
In 1996 landslide movement monitoring was initiated using exten-
someters (TORGOEV et alii, 2001). Monitoring results testify the con-
tinuous movements beginning during moisture-abundant spring sea-
son in 1998, and their speed increased to 3-5 mm/day in February
2001 after earthquake series fixed within a radius of 200 km from
Mailuu-Suu town. The total magnitude of landslide head movement
over a period from 1998 to 2003 came to 3 m.
The main hazard of Koi-Tash landslide simultaneous failure is
the complete riverbed blockage and dam formation. In such a case
the dam’s height may reach 15 to 20 m. The riverbed will be blocked
for more than 200 m. If maximum river discharge rate will be 100
m3/s, than approximately within 3-5 days about 1×106 m3 of water
will accumulate and overtop the dam. In case of uncontrolled dam’s
breach the outburst discharge may exceed 600 m3/s and the rate of
flood wave may reach 5 m/s.
Such disastrous events and most of all the flood wave with more
than 600 m3/s of water discharge rate may lead to catastrophic con-
sequences, specifically to tailings washout and to collapse of down-
stream civil, industrial buildings and objects of infrastructure
(bridges, pipelines). Flood wave transformation inti destructive
debris flow can not be excluded.
Another indirect effect of flooding and dam breach may be the
destruction of large tailings No 5 and 7 in the time of rapid reservoir
emptying with subsequent radioactive contamination of the valley
and the river alluvial fan. This scenario is the most probable in case
of considerable water saturation of tailings No 5 and 7 due to their
inundation during a period of more than 6-7 days. If water discharge
in the time of breach will exceed 600 m3/s radioactive contamination
can reach densely populated and highly productive Fergana valley on
the territory of Uzbekistan.
ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE MITIGATION MEA-
SURES
In terms of hazard identification of possible river blockages and
tailings destruction risk assessments the team of the International and
National experts within the framework of the preliminary stage of the
World Bank Project “Kyrgyz Republic. Natural Disaster Mitigation
Project” have proposed the following arrangements:
On the Tectonic landslide site – to remove some portions of land-
slide masses approximately 80000 m3 in volume to decrease land-
slide impact risk for tailings No 3 and 18 and/or to transfer the tail-
ing No 3 into safer place.
On the Koi-Tash landslide site owing to the impossibility to sta-
bilize substantial volume of landslide masses for a long period of
time and taking into consideration unavoidable river blockage in case
of landslide activation the various engineering decisions have been
proposed. The main goal of the decisions is to avoid the total river
blockage in case of large landslide and thereby to prevent flooding of
the tailings No 5 and 7 and outburst wave (VANDENHOVE et alii,
2003). It can be done by construction of the derivation tunnels on the
rivers’ right bank, in particular. River canalization as the more low-
cost solution is possible to implement by reinforced-concrete pipes or
canals covered by concrete wall restraining landslide masses that
finally will provide for free river flow preventing flooding hazard for
tailings No 5 and 7.
CONCLUSIONS
Slopes of the Mailuu-Suu River valley that pass through the
radioactive waste warehousing area of the former uranium mine are
affected by large-scale landslides, which develop actively owing to
specificity of geologic and natural conditions, of high seismic and
geodynamic activity of the region and due to results of intensive
man-caused impact.
During the last 10 years the phenomena of complete or partial
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Figure 2 - Map of a zone of a sliding defeat and flooding at tailing No 3
destruction
damming of Mailuu-Suu River was studied and monitoring of the
landslide-prone slopes have been performed. It was found that acti-
vation of large-scale landslides could lead to river damming with dis-
astrous consequences due to possible radioactive waste tailings
destruction. It is concerned to the Tectonic landslide which directly
threat tailings No 3 and 18, and, especially to the Koi-Tash large-
scale (V=5×106 m3) landslide. In case if the latter with collapse
entirely, the formation and subsequent catastrophic breach of land-
slide dam may occur causing radioactive waste tailings collapse and
large areas within the river valley and its alluvial fan contamination,
which may affect both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
To avert disastrous effects of river damming a series of engineer-
ing decisions have been proposed. The most effective and reliable are
the Tectonic landslide cut off and drainage and/or the derivation tun-
nels (canals) construction at the Koi-Tash landslide site.
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